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FICHTE 1S MODIFICATION OF KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL 
IDEALISM IN THE WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE OF 179 4 
AND INTRODUCTIONS OF 1797 
Charles Griswold 
In this essay I study Fichte's modification of 
Kant's Transcendental Idealism. 1 Since the Gründlage 
der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre of 1794 and two Intro-
ductions of 1797 present this modification more ex-
plicitly and clearly than do Fichte's later works, and 
since these earlier works were studied by Hegel in the 
Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems 
der Philosophie/ I shall confine myself to them.^ Fichte 
is one of the central figures, if not the central figure, 
in the transition from Kant to Hegel, and thus stands at 
the centre of "German Idealism." I hope that the follow-
ing study will suggest, however, that Fichte's thought 
is of philosophical, as well as historical, interest. 
I will begin by stating the ways in which Fichte sees 
himself as modifying Kant's teaching. I will then 
state the Kantian criticisms of this modification. 
Having outlined the controversy between Kant and 
Fichte, I will discuss parts of the GWL, especially 
the three Grundsatze der gesamten Wissenshaftslehre. 
I will, in conclusion, make several remarks about the 
relationship of Fichte to Kant, and of Transcendental 
Idealism as a whole to Hegel's Absolute Idealism. 
Throughout the GWL of 1794, and the two Introductions 
of 1797, Fichte characterizes his position as the media-
tion of "dogmatic realism" and "dogmatic idealism." Kant 
offers an almost identical formulation of his own posi-
tion. 3 The two kinds of dogmatism are based on the 
fundamental distinction between mind and body, intel-
ligence and matter, or better yet, between subject and 
object. The dogmatic idealist insists on the primacy 
of the free activity of the self, intelligence, the 
subject. The object is merely chimerical. The dogmatic 
realist insists on the primacy of the body, matter, the 
object. The self is merely chimerical. Kant and Fichte 
take the "middle way" in this "gigantomachia." 
Fichte's explicit criticism of the dogmatists (one • 
that is implicit in Kant's Refutation of Idealism: CPR 
B274-5 and context) is that they cannot explain the fact 
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of self-consciousness, or more accurately, the unity of 
self-consciousness and consciousness. The dogmatic 
realist will try either to deny self-consciousness alto-
gether, or to explain it as the effect of the object on 
intelligence. The former claim leads to the absurd re-
sult that if it were true, its advocate could not say 
that it is his claim or explain why it is true. The 
latter claim might show how the self has an impression 
of the object, but not how the self is conscious that 
it has such an impression (2nd Intro., pp. 74-80). The 
dogmatic realist stays on the level of consciousness. 
The dogmatic idealist, on the other hand, also loses 
self-consciousness but by doing away with consciousness. 
Yet one essential component of self-consciousness is 
the object of consciousness. The object cannot be 
assimilated into the subject without destroying the 
subject's consciousness of himself. Fichte's mediation 
between the two dogmatic positions may be summarized as 
a ". . . complete deduction of all experience from the 
possibility of self-consciousness" (2nd Intro., p. 37). 
While self-consciousness is possible only if both self 
and object are preserved, the deduction from the pos-
sibility of self-consciousness, Transcendental Idealism, 
is still a kind of idealism. The reason for this is 
that it is impossible to "abstract from the self" (2nd 
Intro., p. 71; GWL pp. 98, 202, 252). The object is 
given, but given for us; the dispute between dogmatists 
exists only for us as self-conscious selves; and so on. 
Fichte 's actual presentation of Transcendental 
Idealism is nonetheless very different from that of 
Kant. Fichte states that he is developing the "spirit" 
of Kant's philosophy (2nd Intro., p. 52; GWL p. 171, 
note 3 ) , building on foundations laid by Kant (2nd Intro., 
p. 51), making explicit what Kant left implicit (GWL p. 
100), or simply understanding Kant properly (1st Intro., 
p. 3; 2nd Intro., p. 43). All of this was vehemently 
denied by the Kantians of the time (Reinhold, Schulze, 
Eberhard), and finally by Kant himself.4 Fichte's 
development of Kant's teaching is based on three discre-
pancies between its "spirit" and its "word." First, 
Fichte believes that the basic outlines of Kant's 
"Copernican turn" are correct. Kant sees that we deter-
mine appearances through the spontaneous synthesis of 
thought in the categories, and so that "concepts rest 
on functions" (CPR B93). But Kant does not deduce those 
categories from a single principle. Kant merely finds 
the categories, so to speak. Nor does he deduce the 
forms of intuition, or successfully state their relation 
to the categories (2nd Intro., p. 51). Kant does not 
possess a system; the parts are there, but in a heap.5 
Second, Fichte believes that Kant correctly sees 
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that the transcendental unity of apperception, the pure 
I, must lie at the basis of all consciousness. In Kant's 
terms, "it must be possible for the 'I think' to ac-
company all my representations" (CPR B131). The "I 
think" is original apperception, the act of spontaneity, 
the "transcendental unity of self-consciousness" (CPR 
Bl32)~ This unity is the "highest principle" of all 
logic and transcendental philosophy (CPR B135; note, 
B134). Hence Fichte observes that for Kant the pos-
sibility of consciousness will be conditioned by the 
possibility of pure self-consciousness (2nd Intro,, p. 
50 ) . However, Kant fails to demonstrate this "condi-
tioning" coherently, i.e., he does not give a systematic 
derivation of all consciousness. To do so, Kant would 
have had to begin with the "pure I" and derive the cat-
egories and the forms of intuition, instead of doing the 
opposite. This systematic derivation in Fichte has, as 
we shall see, crucial consequences for the "Ding an 
sich." In short, for Fichte the "thing in itself" is a 
concept. 
Third, Fichte accuses Kant of omitting a crucial 
element of the explanation of self-consciousness. Kant 
does not explain how the 'I' "accompanies" every repre-
sentation. Had he done so, he would have accepted, 
rather than rejected, intellectual intuition (intel-
lektuelle Anschauung). This faculty is indispensable, 
in Fichte's view, Tn explaining our consciousness of 
identity through time, as well as our consciousness of 
the moral law.& Fichte does not mention intellectual 
intuition in the GWL of 1794, however, but it is hinted 
at in the preface of 1795 (GWL p. 91) and defended 
vigorously in the Introductions of 1797.7 
The major Kantian criticisms of the modification of 
Transcendental Idealism are twofold. First, and most 
obviously, Kant had simply rejected intellectual in-
tuition. The reason for this rejection is crucial. 
Kant argues in the Transcendental Aesthetic (CPR, B 
edition) and the Paralogisms (CPR) that the subject has 
no immediate intuition of himself because all self-
consciousness is mediated by inner sense, and finally 
through outer sense as well (Refutation of Idealism, 
CPR Bxl, B277). Fichte replies that intellectual in-
tuition is always accompanied by concepts and sensory 
intuition (2nd Intro., pp. 38-9), and that we are not 
ever conscious of this intellectual intuition. Intel-
lectual intuition cannot be reduced to concepts and so 
become an object of analysis. In other words, Fichte 
agrees with Kant that self-consciousness is possible 
only by the subject's mediation of subject and object. 
Nevertheless, intellectual intuition must exist if we 
are to explain certain facts of which we are conscious 
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— i . e . , identity through time and space, and the moral 
law (2nd Intro., pp. 45-6). To say that we are mediately 
conscious of this identity is to say that we are not in 
fact conscious of it. 
The second major Kantian objection to Fichte's mod-
ifications is that Kant's system requires a "thing in 
itself." Sensations must be initiated by the "thing in 
itself" even though that thing is unknowable. There are 
appearances which we know, so there must be something be-
hind what appears (CPR A251-2). Fichte's xeply is that 
the few passages in the CPR to that effect must be inter-
preted in the light of the "CPR as a whole. The notion 
of causality, which first gives rise to the view that 
there are "things in themselves" (the "giveness" being 
an effect on us) is nothing but a subjective category 
of the understanding. Hence its use cannot show that 
there are such things. Fichte agrees with Kant that 
noumena may be necessary as "limiting concepts" (CPR 
A255). But the Critique as a whole shows that this 
necessity is only subjective, i.e., a necessity of 
thought. In Fichte's terms, the not-I, the pure "give-
ness" of the "thing in itself," is "posited" (setzen) 
by the absolute I (the transcendental unity of appercep-
tion) . For Fichte this thesis is the core of Tran-
scendental Idealism. To insist on an independent "thing 
in itself" is to regress to dogmatic realism, and so to 
lose seif-consciousness. 
Yet this seems to turn Fichte into a dogmatic 
idealist, because it seems to destroy the "affection" 
and "receptivity" of the Transcendental Aesthetic (CPR). 
Kant accused Fichte of trying to deduce existence and 
affection from a concept, and so of uniting the two 
"stems of human knowledge" (CPR B 2 9 ) . 8 Fichte denied 
this accusation; he too insists on the "facticity" of 
experience, on the feeling of being necessitated or 
affected by the object: "The object is not a priori, 
but is first given to that science (GWL) in experience; 
objective validity is furnished of everyone by his own 
consciousness of the object, which consciousness can 
only be postulated a priori, but not deduced" (GWL p. 
224; see also pp. 105-6, 223, 242, 246 ff.). However, 
Fichte argues that reflection on this experience cannot 
self-consciously postulate a "thing in itself," though 
it may have to postulate an ideal "thing in itself." 
The GWL is, Fichte says, an empirical realism and a 
transcendental idealsim (2nd Intro., p. 61; GWL pp. 147, 
174, 2 46-7). This is equivalent to the teaching of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic (GWL p. 62) . Time and space 
are transcendentally ideal because they do not belong 
to "things in themselves." They are empirically real 
because they are "objectively" valid, i.e., necessary 
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conditions for any object being an appearance for us 
(CPR B44). Kant errs, however, in trying to demonstrate 
"the ideality of objects from the presupposed ideality 
of space and time" (GWL p. 171, note). By beginning 
with the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant can only assert 
the ideality of space and time, and so suggest the tran-
scendental reality of "things in themselves." This con-
fusion is avoided if the procedure is reversed; the 
ideality of objects, and that in turn from the "highest 
principle" under which anything can be an object of 
thought for us at all, the Absolute 1.9 
Let me now begin with the GWL itself. The "architec-
tonic" is very different from that of the C P R . 1 0 All of 
Kant's rigid distinctions are, so to speak, collapsed 
and set into motion. 1 1 Perhaps the most important change, 
for our purposes, is that of method. Fichte's "deductive" 
method is tripartite—the famous thesis, antithesis, and 
synthesis. 1 2 Antithesis is the act of seeking in things 
equated the respect in which they are opposed. Fichte 
says that this is what Kant calls "analysis." Synthesis 
consists of discovering in opposites the respect in 
which they are alike. Antithesis and synthesis are 
equivalent to dividing and collecting according to genus 
and difference. Antithesis shows the difference which 
separates species from genus, while synthesis shows why 
the species belongs to the given genus (GWL p. 114). 
Both procedures are based on the thesis, in which nothing 
is opposed or conjoined. There is only one thesis in 
the GWL; the Absolute I, the "I am" as such (2nd Intro., 
p. 73; GWL p. 114). 
What Kant calls "analysis" seems to include both 
the antithesis and the synthesis of Fichte.i3 Analysis 
for Kant is simply conceptual. Kant's "synthesis," how-
ever, is not equivalent to that of Fichte. For Kant 
synthetic judgements are "judgements of experience" (CPR A 
154 , 158). In these judgements it is necessary to 
"advance beyond a given concept," i.e., to include 
sensible intuitions. The a priori synthetic unity of 
concepts must be exhibited in experience or in a "pos-
sible experience." There can be a priori synthetic 
judgements because "the conditions of the possibility of 
experience in general are likewise the conditions of the 
possibility of objects of experience" (CPR A 158, 111). 
This is hardly reducible to the "discovering in opposites 
the respect in which they are alike" (Fichte's "syn-
thesis"). The net effect is that in Fichte the criterion 
of "possible experience" is dropped. Alternatively, the 
meaning of "experience" has changed. For Kant, "exper-
ience" and "knowledge" are almost synonymous terms. For 
Fichte, while experience is the unity of concepts and 
intuitions, knowledge of that experience requires only 
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that concepts of intuitions be joined to concepts of the 
understanding. "Knowledge" for Fichte seems to be more 
like what Kant calls the "principles of pure reason" 
(CPR A 299-302). I shall return to this point below. 
In sum, Fichte alters the relation between concepts and 
intuitions which Kant appears to advocate. Whether or 
not this alteration makes Kant consistent has yet to be 
decided. 
Fichte's first principle is the 1=1, the Absolute I 
(absolute Ich), i.e., the transcendental unity of apper-
ception. I have already discussed why Fichte starts 
with the I, and so with self-consciousness—it is the 
"highest principle." But how does he get to the 1=1? 
Fichte begins with a "fact of consciousness," the prin-
ciple of identity, A=A. This principle is accepted by 
everyone; but why is it true? The principle says that 
if A is given, then A must follow; nothing is said about 
the existence of A. Its truth is that necessary con-
nection, the "=" itself, which Fichte entitles "X." X 
is the "form" of A=A, while the two A's are the "con-
tent." This form is equivalent to the 1=1, which Fichte 
also calls "pure self-reverting activity." "pure spon-
taneity." The Absolute I posits A=A, and only for that 
reason does A=A seem so certain. The ordo cognoscendi . 
(the principles of speech) images, so to speak, the 
ordo essendi (the pure "I think").14 
The relationship between these two orders is not, 
however, symmetrical. The 1=1 and A=A have the same 
logical form, but a different, meaning. The two state-
ments are thus "wholly different" (GWL p. 96). The I 
is the perfect unity of form and content, subject and 
object, positing and existence. Unlike A=A, the prin-
ciple 1=1 is posited " . . . not conditionally, but 
absolutely, with the predicate of equivalence to itself" 
(GWL p. 96). The self-identity of the Absolute, which 
sustains the logical principle A=A or "posits" the two 
A's as identical, is itself " . . . valid not merely in 
form but also in content" (GWL p. 96). But we can dif-
ferentiate form and content, positing and existence, in 
both 1=1 and A=A. Although the terms in each equation 
are the "same," they are still numerically "different" 
(in that respect one A or I is_ not the other A or I_. 
Thus while 1=1 (which shares the same logical form as 
A=A) might mean "Absolute I," it cannot accurately say 
it. The Absolute I reveals itself in discourse, but in 
so doing conceals or alters itself.15 The source of 
Activity and the products of Activity are discontinuous: 
". ... initially I am neither the reflecting subject nor 
the reflected object, and neither of the two is condi-
tioned by the other, since I am both in combination; 
though this union I cannot indeed think; since in the 
act of doing so I separate the reflected from that which 
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reflects" (GWL pp. 60-61). The reflecting subject is 
the Absolute I, the reflected object is the Absolute as 
articulated in discourse; the articulation is not fully 
adequate to the articulated and as such is separate from 
it. This problem, which I will return to below, is 
fundamental to the GWL. Fichte's attempts to resolve 
it lead to the "ought" (Sollen) of practice (GWL pp. 102, 
229, 230 note), and to the doctrine of intellectual in-
tuition (above). In Fichte's view, the problem is intrin-
sic to Transcendental Idealism, though it was not recog-
nized as such by Kant. 
There is another aspect to the difference between 
the Absolute I and its articulation in discourse. The 
Absolute I is "permanently uniform, forever one and the 
same" (GWL p. 96; also 2nd Intro., pp. 40, 63, 7 5 ) . Dis-
course, on the other hand, is in flux. In some sense, 
the Absolute I is eternal. The same point is implicit 
in Kant. For Kant, all self-consciousness is in time; 
but the transcendental unity of apperception does not, 
presumably, change. Kant insists that this unity is a 
"logical" condition (cf. the Paralogisms, B edition, CPR), 
but leaves the exact status of this condition undermined 
with respect to its permanence. In his effort to deduce 
Critical Philosophy from the transcendental unity of 
apperception, Fichte brings to light several problems 
concerning the relation of that unity to what it unifies. 
While Fichte denies that the transcendental unity of 
apperception is transcendent (the I is not a noumenon; 
GWL pp. 101, 117, 140, 226, 246-47), that unity, now 
translated as the "Absolute I," looks more and more like 
God. In the GWL, at least, Fichte would resist the 
identification of the Absolute I with God.16 
Fichte's second principle is another "certain" 
fact of consciousness, Aj*-A ("A is not equal to not A " ) . 
This principle is the basis for the principles of excluded 
middle and contradiction. While it means the same thing 
as the principle of identity, it introduces a new term; 
-A, or negation. Correspondingly, in the ordo essendi 
-I ("not-I") has been introduced. This second principle 
is based on the first; logically, because -A cannot be 
stated without A, while the reverse is not true; ontolog-
ically, because the I is assumed by the -I, not vice versa, 
and because in order to explain self-consciousness and so 
consciousness of the -I, we must begin with the I (the 
"highest principle"). This means that the I posits it-
self as 1=1, and so posits A=A; then the I posits -I, or 
I^-I, and A^-A. However, in order to posit I^-I, the I 
must first posit -I; but in doing so the I contradicts 
itself. That contradiction is not visible in the state-
ments "A=A and "A5*-A" since "A" is not an activity which 
first posits itself and then its opposite. 
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Let me try to clarify further this transition from 
the first to the second principle. Fichte says that 
" . . . even the possibility of counter-positing (i.e.. 
of positing the not-I) itself presupposes the identity 
of consciousness" (GWL p. 103). Hence we begin with 
the I and then move to the not-I. In Kant's terms, we 
begin with original apperception and then move to the 
object, which is by definition what original appercep-
tion is_ not. In Fichte's terms, we move from reality 
to negation (note that these are two of Kant's categor-
ies) , since there is nowhere else to move to if we begin 
with reality. 
But this introduces a decisive problem. The -I or 
-A, being negations of I and A, are materially condition-
ed by I and A respectively. The negation itself, i.e., 
the "form" of the proposition, cannot be derived from 
the I or A. Reality and negation are formally discon-
tinuous . Thus the -I must have been "absolutely posited" 
just as the I was. Since only the I can posit, the -I 
must have been posited by the I; yet this is impossible, 
since there is no negation in the I to begin with. Hence 
there is no strict deduction of the principle of negation 
from that of reality, i.e., no deduction of opposition 
from identity. As Fichte says over and over again, that 
the -I should be posited cannot be theoretically deter-
mined (above) ; but it is determinable that if_ something 
is to be posited after the I, it must be the not-I 
(GWL pp. 144, 145, 153, 154, 171; and part I, section 2 ) . 
Yet this does not explain how there can be any positing 
of negation after the I. The I is absolute, the totality, 
reality; how can something be other than the totality? 
In sum, "factic" experience shows that there is a not-I; 
but reflection cannot systematically account for it, as 
it ought to. The discontinuity between the source of 
synthetic activity (Absolute I) and its product (not-I) 
means that the Kantian split between the transcendental 
unity of apperception and the thing in itself cannot be 
overcome. However, it cannot be affirmed either. 
To restate these last few points "theologically," one 
could say that for Fichte the reasons for God's creation 
are unknowable. What can be known is that if God creates, 
He must create the negation of Himself, namely the finite 
world—His image. But in this creation God contradicts 
himself, since He is limited by His creation and so is 
no longer God, i.e.. Totality. Moreover, even God's 
thought of creating before the actual creation contradicts 
His nature; thinking is self-consciousness, and depends 
on images and negativity. God contains no negativity, 
and so cannot be self-conscious.17 But there is a cre-
ation and we are compelled to think of it as created.18 
Yet we cannot conceive of how God could have created 
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the world, i.e./ we cannot deduce the one from the other. 
This is closely linked to another problem; we cannot 
accurately articulate God as He is "in Himself." We can 
recognize ourselves as images of God and so have an in-
tuition of the original (God), but any effort to bespeak 
the original simply produces more (verbal) images. To 
translate this back into Fichte's terminology, we can 
intuit but not discursively analyze the Absolute I, 
and we can experience the not-I, but we cannot deduce 
the latter from the former. The third principle of the 
GWL shows that these two difficulties are really two 
sides of the same coin. 
The third principle supplies the category of limita-
tion as the resolution to the contradiction between 
reality and negation. I and not-I limit each other; to 
limit is to negate in part. Something can be limited in 
part only if it is divisible; limitation turns what is 
limited into quantities. This means that the limitation 
of reality by negation has produced a "quantitative" 
reality which is opposed to a "quantitative" negation. 
Yet the Absolute I is unconditioned, and thus "qualita-
tively" real (GWL pp- 109, 110). That is, the third 
principle lowers us from the level of infinitude to the 
level of finitude. The I and the not-I which limit each 
other are finite; neither is equivalent to the Absolute 
I. Finite I and finite not-I contradict each other, and 
both contradict the Absolute I. In some sense the finite 
not-I is posited by the I, and in some sense both finite 
I and not-I are posited by the Absolute I. The situation, 
needless to say, has by now become exceedingly complex, 
and the rest of the GWL is devoted to its analysis. 
Roughly put, the theoretical section of the GWL deals 
with the contradiction between finite I and not-I. The 
thesis of the theoretical section is that "the I posits 
itself as limited by the not-I." This corresponds to 
Kant's Transcendental Analytic (CPR) , i.e., to the effort 
to unite concepts of the understanding (finite I) with 
intuitions (not-I) within the unity of transcendental 
apperception (Absolute I ) . The unity of concepts and 
intuitions takes place at the level of finitude; in-
tuitions "affect" the self but are also themselves 
affected by the syntheses of the self. The problem is 
to see how original apperception, the Absolute I, syn-
thesizes or posits both affections and activities with-
out itself being affected, i.e., how the identity of 
self-consciousness is preserved alongside the contra-
dictions it produces and retains in itself. Reflection 
cannot solve this problem because it is unable to effect 
the "descent" from infinitude to finitude. Nor can it 
effect the "ascent" from finitude to infinitude. The 
practical section of the GWL, which corresponds partly 
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to Kant's Transcendental Dialectic (CPR), but more gen-
erally to the Critique of Practical Reason, "solves" 
this contradiction between infinitude and finitude 
through the "ought" (Sollen). The thesis of practical 
philosophy is that "the I posits itself as limiting the 
not-I." This is the principle of the infinitude of the 
I, legislating autonoumously over nature. It is the 
principle that nature (the not-I) ought to conform to 
the Absolute I. 
The theoretical section of the GWL attempts to re-
solve the contradiction between finite I and not-I by the 
"grounding principle" (Satz des Grundes), a logical ver-
sion of the principle of sufficient reason. It consists 
of applying antithesis and synthesis in the manner de-
scribed above, i.e., of finding the ground of disjunction 
and conjunction of the I and not-I. But this ground can-
not be found precisely because it is impossible to ascend 
discursively to the grounding Absolute I or to the summum 
genus (the ascent is accomplished by intellectual in-
tuition and abstraction). Hence reflection cannot termi-
nate itself; it progresses ad infinitum (GWL pp. 106, 113, 
etc.). For theoretical philosophy, the Absolute I will 
possess only "regulative validity" (GWL p. 119; see also 
p. 164). For practical philosophy, the Absolute I will 
possess constitutive validity; but the constitution of 
nature by the Absolute I is an "ought." The "ought" is 
accompanied by "infinite striving;" the desire, never to 
be fulfilled, to make the "ought" actual. The Absolute 
I is given in intellectual intuition, but cannot be made 
actual in practice, just as previously it could not be 
made actual in theory (concepts and discourse). 
As opposed to the Absolute I, the not-I is "abso-
lutely nothing." As opposed to the finite I, the not-I 
is a negative quantity, insofar as it is opposed to the 
not-I, the finite I too would seem to be "absolutely 
nothing" in relation to the Absolute I. We seem to have 
here a confirmation of Hegel's point that Verstand.(under-
standing, or the finite I) cut off from Being (infinitude) 
rests on Nothingness (Nichts). From Hegel's point of 
view, both Kant and Fichte failed to overcome this 
Nothingness, and so failed to explain the Absolute. 
Fichte's cure for this Nothing is the "ought" accompanied 
by intellectual intuition; hence his idealism is "practi-
cal" (GWL p. 147). Morality is the antidote for the 
weakness of the understanding. From Hegel's point of 
view, however, Fichte's reliance on intellectual intuition 
is contentless subjective feeling.20 The corresponding 
subjectivity of the Absolute I prevents Fichte from ex-
plaining the externality of the not-I; Fichte is a sub-
jective idealist.21 in Fichte, the Absolute becomes an 
ideal, which ". . . floats as a vision before us, and is 
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rooted in our innermost nature" (GWL p. 238). The vision 
cannot be actualized; the finite I cannot be absolute, 
but it can unceasingly strive to be absolute. Hegel 
claimed to actualize the vision of the Absolute in dis-
course; thus it is not surprising that he dispenses with 
intellectual intuition, and perhaps with the "ought" as 
well. 
In sum, the Absolute I has two aspects. On the one 
hand, it is needed in order to explain self-consciousness. 
Self-consciousness must be understood in the light of the 
fact that it is always 1^  who am self-conscious (the "I 
think" must accompany all my representations), and that 
the unity of consciousness is a synthesis spontaneously 
effected by the I. Even the object of consciousness, 
while retaining all of its "factic" empirical reality, 
must be explained as a product of the I. On the other 
hand, the Absolute I makes morality possible, since it 
is the source of our legislation over nature. Thus one 
might say that Fichte's Absolute I combines the tran-
scendental ego of Kant's first Critique with the homo 
noumenon of the second Critique. In any event, the im-
possibility of denying the actuality of the -I, and 
finally combined with the demands of theory and practice 
that the -I be determined by the I, define the contra-
dictoriness of human existence. "This fact, that the 
finite spirit must necessarily posit something absolute 
outside itself (a thing in itself), and yet must recog-
nize, from the other side, that the latter exists only 
for it (as a necessary noumenon), is that circle which 
it is able to extend into infinity, but can never escape 
(GWL p. 247). 
The result is that for Fichte the not-I, or what 
Kant calls the "thing in itself," cannot be proved or 
denied. Every effort to prove that it exists either 
loses self-consciousness, or shows only that we must 
think "as if" it exists. Every effort to prove that it 
does not exist must do so by.deriving it from the Abso-
lute I. Yet that is impossible, because the Absolute I 
and the not-I are formally discontinuous, and the Abso-
lute I cannot in any case be articulated as it is in it-
self, (i.e., as undifferentiated pure activity). The 
"thing in itself," as Fichte strikingly puts it, is 
"nowhere and everywhere at once." Any attempt to change 
this status of the "thing in itself" " . . . would entail 
the elimination of all consciousness, and with it of all 
existence" (GWL p. 249). Thus in the final analysis, 
Fichte's position on the "thing in itself" is very close 
to that of Kant, or at least to one of Kant's characteri-
zations of it as a "problematic" concept (CPR B310). 
Fichte, like Kant, insists on human finitude. On 
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the one hand, it is impossible to articulate the Abso-
lute I, the first principle of all knowledge. On the 
other hand it is equally impossible to define the not-I 
as it ought to be defined, i.e., as a product of the 
Absolute I. But Fichte's demonstration of this finitude 
seems to be superior to that of Kant's in exactly the 
ways which Fichte indicates; it is more coherent, sys-
tematic, and presents the real thrust of Transcendental 
Idealism more consistently. At the same time, Fichte's 
presentation of Transcendental Idealism clarifies some of 
the problems of that doctrine—in particular, the problem 
of discursively uniting reality and negation in the ac-
tivity of the Absolute I. Fichte achieves this clarifi-
cation in great part because of his main modification of 
Transcendental Idealism; the demand that everything be 
deduced from the Absolute I. Hegel, in turn, comple-
ments Fichte for attempting to carry out this modifica-
tion, but criticizes him for failing to complete the 
deduction.22 
Fichte seems also to be superior to Kant in that he 
is more self-conscious than Kant about the status of 
philosophical reflection in the "Science of Knowledge." 
As noted above, Kant seems to equate knowledge and ex-
perience; both are the result of the work of understand-
ing (Verstand) together with intuitions. Pure reason 
(Vernunft) seems to have a solely "dialectical," and so 
negative, function. And yet the Critique of Pure Reason 
is both a critique about pure reason (as Fichte notes; 
GWL p. 216) and a critique carried out by_ pure reason 
(cf. CPR Axi-xii). Hence the definition of "knowledge" 
in the CPR does not seem to include the definition it-
self. The faculty of producing the definition (reason) 
seems to be inferior to the faculty it defines (under-
standing) . This split between meta-level (or critical 
and transcendental level) and object-level considerably 
weakens Kant's "criticism" as a whole, and seems to be-
tray a loss of self-consciousness about the meaning of 
"criticism." Unless the conditions for the possibility 
of knowledge are themselves objects of knowledge, it is 
impossible to defend those conditions as the true ones. 
Hegel criticizes Kant on these grounds; in effect, Kant 
lost self-consciousness about his own project.23 
Fichte avoids this criticism of Kant, at least in 
part. In short, Fichte unites Kant's Transcendental 
Analytic with his Transcendental Dialectic in a continuous 
deduction by_ pure reason from the Absolute I, i.e., from 
pure reason itself (GWL p. 216). While Fichte still dis-
tinguishes understanding from reason (GWL pp. 207, 214-16), 
as well as "natural" reflection from philosophical re-
flection (2nd Intro., pp. 30, 47; GWL pp. 196-220, 208, 
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216-17). he insists that reason's investigation of itself 
produces knowledge (hence the title "Wissenschaftslehre") . 
Fichte is very much aware of the "circle" involved in 
this self-investigation: but he is equally aware of the 
impossibility of avoiding it without losing self-conscious-
ness and so an accurate account of "the possibility of 
self-consciousness" (2nd Intro./ p. 37). For the self to 
try to abstract from itself ". . . is a contradiction/ 
since it is impossible that what does the abstracting 
should ahstract from itself" (2nd Intro., p. 71; GWL pp. 
98, 202, 252). By beginning with itself, the "highest 
principle" or the "Absolute thesis" (2nd Intro., p. 73; 
GWL pp. 114-15), pure reason can deduce everything 
lower" while not losing itself in the process. A con-
sequence of this procedure is that Fichte seems to deduce 
both the a priori and the a posteriori; they are " . . . 
merely two points of view, to be distinguished solely 
by the mode of our approach" (1st Intro., p. 26). Most 
importantly, intuitions seem to be deduced, i.e., equiva-
lent to concepts of intuitions. Yet that is not entirely 
possible; the "thing in itself" behind intuitions is 
finally a "problematic concept." If this signifies a 
failure in Fichte's deduction, however, at least it is 
a fully self-conscious failure. 
In conclusion, Fichte's modifications of, and advance 
over, Kant can be restated as follows. Kant's Transcen-
dental Analytic (CPR) ends with a chapter entitled "The 
Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in General into 
Phenomena and Noumena," a chapter which serves as the 
transition to the Transcendental Dialectic. This of 
course is no accident; the distinction between phenomena 
and noumena, first suggested in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic, and then established by the Transcendental 
Analytic, also serves to define the dialectical use of 
reason. From Fichte's point of view, however, the dis-
tinction is not only a transition to dialectic, it is_ 
dialectical, insofar as it is a distinction of pure reason. 
The distinction cannot be established in the Transcendental 
Analytic, let alone in the Transcendental Aesthetic, 
before Tt is deduced from reason by reason itself. Fichte 
in effect deduces it in the three Grundsätze, i.e., in 
part I of the GWL, before the sections on theory and 
practice. In Kant's Transcendental Dialectic, the dis-
tinction between phenomena and noumena is invoked in 
order to resolve an antinomy between freedom and nature. 
At the end of part II of the GWL, Fichte analyzes this 
antinomy as a contradiction between infinitude and 
finitude. In Fichte's terms, the ground of the third 
antinomy (and so of the Categorical Imperative) lies in 
the I's reflection on itself. If on the one hand the I 
reflects upon itself and so determines itself, the not-I 
(nature) is infinite and unbounded (the realist posi-
tion) . If on the other hand the I reflects on the not-I 
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and so determines it, the I (freedom) is infinite (the 
idealsit position). Kant stopped at this point, and 
"solved" the conflict through the distinction between 
phenomena and noumena. 
However, Fichte points out that there is still a 
higher reflection to be accomplished, namely the re-
flection that the antinomy is itself a product of reason 
(GWL p. 217). The same is true forthe distinction be-
tween phenomena and noumena. To perform this higher 
reflection is to become fully self-conscious, and so to 
go beyond the antinomy, though it does not so much remove 
the antinomy as to place it on a more complex level. 
For Fichte, this more complex level must in turn be 
transposed by reflection onto still another level, and 
so on ad infinitum. Hegel's task is to close the circle 
of reflection and so to transform self-consciousness into 
complete, and discursive, self-knowledge. 
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NOTES 
^"This essay was presented, on October 23, 1976, to 
the American Graduate Student Conference in Philosophy, 
at the American University. In an expanded form, it 
was submitted to the Department of Philosophy at the 
Pennsylvania State University in completion of the Master 
of Arts degree. I am indebted to Dr. Thomas Seebohm for 
his helpful comments and criticisms. The present essay 
is intended solely as an introduction to Fichte and not 
as a thorough study of his thought. 
2 
J. G. Fichte, Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaft-
slehre (1794) and Erste und Zweite Einleitungen in die 
Wissenschaftslehre, trans. P. Heath and J. Lachs (New 
York: Appleton, 1970). All references to the Wlssen-
schaftslehre (abbreviated GWL) and to the Introductions 
advert to this translation and are included directly in 
the text. Concerning the title "GWL," W. G. Jacobs notes 
in his intoduction to the Meiner edition (Hamburg: 1970), 
p. viii: "Fichte schrieb hier, wie der Titel sagt, kein 
Werk der ersten Philosophie, sondern sozusagen Meditationes 
de prima philosophia: er Uberlegt nicht metaphysische 
Probleme, sondern wie überhaupt Probleme der Metaphysik 
zu begründen sind." It is also worth noting that Hegel's 
criticisms of Fichte in the "Differenzschrift" remain 
substantially unchanged in Hegel's later works; thus 
Fichte's Jena period is the most important for our pur-
poses. Cf. H. Girndt, Differenz des Fichteschen und 
Hegeischen Systems (Bonn! Bouvier u. Co., 1965), p. x: 
"Hegel hat seine in der "Differenzschrift" dargelegte 
Auffasung von der Philosophie Fichtes später nie 
revidiert. . . . " 
3 I . Kant, "The History of Pure Reason," Kritik der 
Reinen Vernunft, trans. N. K. Smith (New York: St. MartTn's 
Press, 1965) . See also B 274 ff. All references to the 
Critique of Pure Reason (abbreviated CPR) advert to this 
translation and are included directly in the text. Cf. 
M. Guerolt, "L'Antidogmatisme de Kant et de Fichte," in 
Etudes sur Fichte (New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 1974), 
II, p. 17: "L'antidogmatisme de Kant et celui de Fichte 
se reveilent bien identiques dans leur esprit: ce qu'ils 
affirment tous les deux, en face du dogmatisme, c'est 
l'absoluite de l'acte du sujet, auqüel ils subordonnent 
l'objet." 
4 
Kant, "Erklärung in Beziehung auf Fichtes Wissen-
schaftslehre, " Ak. Bd. XII, p. 370, cited by Ä. Philonenko, 
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La Liberte dans la Philosophie de Fichte (Paris: Librarie 
Philosophique J. Vrin, 1966), pp. 105-6. It should be 
noted that Fichte distinguished the Kantians from Kant; 
the .Kantians misinterpreted Kant, in Fichte's view. For 
Fichte's reply to Kant's disclaimer, see 2nd Intro., p. 
43, n. 4. 
5 k Fichte cites several passages in which Kant him-self seems to say that the CPR is merely propadeutical: 2nd Intro., p. 51, n. 7. 
^Intellectual intuition and the moral law are 
closely related; the moral law warrants belief in the 
reality of the object of intellectual intuition. See 
2nd Intro., pp. 40-41. One might also say that since 
intellectual intuition cannot be reduced to concepts, 
there is for Fichte a "giveness" for consciousness 
analogous to the "giveness" in Kant's sensible intuitions. 
7 
For a full discussion of intellectual intuition in 
Fichte, see A. Philonenko, ibid., part I, ch. 5. Philonen-
ko opposes Hegel's interpretation of intellectual intuition 
in Fichte, and finds the GWL and the two Introductions 
reconcilable. I believe that the correct solution lies 
between the positions of Philonenko and Hegel. In some 
sense the Absolute I is reached by "abstraction" as well 
as by intellectual intuition (cf. GWL pp. 215-16). 
g 
See note (f 4 above. 
g 
Fichte barely mentions space and time as deduced 
categories in the GWL. See p. 171, n. 3; pp. 194, 201, 
275. 
1 0 T h e GWL is divided into three parts; the "Funda-
mental Principles. . . ," the "Foundation of Theoretical 
Knowledge," and the "Foundation of Knowledge of the 
Practical." The first part is neither theoretical nor 
practical, but rather the basis for both theory and prac-
tice. Part II corresponds roughly to the Transcendental 
Analytic (CPR); part III combines elements of the Tran-~ 
scendental Dialectic (CPR), Transcendenta1 Doctrine of 
Method, and the Critique of Practical Reason. The Tran-
scendental Aesthetic (CPRl^Ls hardly present at all, and 
morality is barely mentioned (see pp. 230, 259, 285). 
Fichte does not distinguish "analytic" from "dialectic;" 
the latter term is not used at all in the GWL. 
1XC£. A. Philonenko, ibid., pp. 164, 307-9, 334. 
Philonenko tries to interpret the course of the GWL 
as the opposite of that of the CPR. There is some truth 
to this, but part II of the GWL also follows the order 
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of the Transcendental Deduction (CPR. B edition). It 
should be noted also that part III of the GWL includes 
a discussion of feelings and drives, which explains the 
"facticity" of experience. Fichte attempts to produce 
a holistic analysis of man (GWL pp. 259, 266, 280.) 
12 
In a sense Fichte's method is reminiscent of 
Leibniz, insofar as it runs together concepts and intui-
tions. In another sense, Fichte's "deduction" is remi-
niscent of Spinoza's method, although the similarity 
between the two is not very deep. For a discussion of 
Fichte's method and its relation to Spinoza, Leibniz, 
and others, see M. Guerolt, L'Evolution et la Structure 
de la Doctrine de la Science chez Fichte, (P"ä~ns: 
Societe D'Edition: Les Belles Lettres, 1930) , I, pp. 
18-51; and R. Adamson, Fichte (New York: 1903), p. 134. 
*"3For Kant, analysis splits up two concepts, one of 
which is "contained in" the other. Relations of species 
to genus, as well as tautologies, fall within the range 
of analytic judgements (CPR, Intro., i v ) . Analysis is 
the explication of a concept according to the principle 
of contradiction, and thus is the work of Verstand (CPR 
B 191-92). Kant also allows for negative and positive 
judgements in analysis (CPR A 154), but Fichte associates 
negative judgements with antithesis, and positive judge-
ments with synthesis. 
14 
One could object that in beginning with a logical 
principle, Fichte assumes a special organon of logic. 
But Fichte is only assuming the principles of any dis-
course whatever; he assumes what he must if he is going 
to speak, and then shows how such principles, and so 
speech in general, are the result of the activity of the 
Absolute I. The principles of discourse are the same 
as, or at least modeled on, the principles of self-
consciousness (GWL pp. 26-28). Hegel criticizes Fichte's 
"beginning" in the Wissenschaft der Logik, trans. W. H. 
Johnston and L. G. Strüthers (New York: Humanities Press, 
1966), I, pp. 87-89. For Hegel, Fichte's starting point 
is arbitrary and subjective, since it is not derived 
adequately. An adequate derivation must begin from 
"ordinary consciousness" and proceed through its "inner 
necessity." 
15 
This formulation of the issue is taken from S. 
Rosen's discussion of the GWL in G. W. F. Hegel: an 
Introduction to the Science of Wisdom, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1974) , p. 10*4. 
1 6 C f . W. G. Jacobs, ibid., p. xi: "Näher liegt es, 
das absolute Ich mit Gott gleichzusetzen; aber wenn auch 
Fichte in der GWL nicht vom Unterschied zwischen Gott 
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und absolutem Ich redet, ist deren Gleichsetzung ein 
Missverständnis." Jacobs correctly notes that "setzen" 
is not equivalent to "schaffen." The Absolute I becomes 
God in some of Fichte's. later works, such as Die Bestim-
mung des Menschen, part III. In that work, however, God 
is the moral order of the world. Note also that Fichte 
separates the personal I from the Absolute I; e.g., in 
the 2nd Intro., pp. 73-75, 83-84. 
17 
Fichte makes this explicit in the GWL p. 242. This, 
together with Fichte's teaching about the immanence of God 
(as the moral order of the world), led to charges of athe-
ism against him. For Fichte's two references to atheism, 
see GWL pp. 220, n. 1, and 245, n. 4. Kant implies 
several times that the divine understanding, consisting 
solely of intellectual intuition, cannot be self-conscious 
(CPR, B 71-72, 148 ff.). 
18 
For Fichte, to assert that the finite does not 
depend on the infinite, is to assert "absolute finitude" 
(GWL p. 169), a self-contradictory concept. To think the 
concept is to transcend it; to become self-conscious about 
a thought is to go beyond that thought. In thinking 
"absolute finitude" one proves that it is not absolute 
(GWL pp. 192-93). Note that the I is "infinite" in 
Fichte in the sense that it is limited by itself only; 
the same is true in Hegel (Phänomenologie des Geistes-
[Hamburg: F. Meiner Verlag, 1952], ch. VI, pp. 313-16). 
19 
Hegel, Differenz des Fichteschen und Schelling-
schen Systems der Philosophie^ (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), p. 26. 
20 
Hegel, Science of Logic, ibid., pp. 88-89. Intel-
lectual intuition in Fichte does seem to be more like a 
feeling than a thought, since what one "sees," i.e., the 
Absolute I, is pure activity, and so has no form or de-
termination. 
21 
Hegel, Differenz. . . , ibid., p. 56: "Das Wesen 
des Ich und sein Setzen fallen nicht zusammen: Ich wird 
sich^nicht objectiv"; and p. 65. See also the Vorlesun-
gen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, trans. E, S. 
Haidane and F. H. Simson (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1955), III, p. 494; and part I of the Enzyklopädie, 
trans. W. Wallace (London: Oxford university Press, rpt. 
1904), pp. 90, 120: Kant is a subjective idealist, and 
Fichte does not go beyond Kant in this respect. 
22 
Hegel, Differenz. . . , ibid., p. 67: "das System, 
das vom Sich-selbst-Setzen ausgeht, führt die Intelligenz 
su einer bedingten Bedingung in ein Endloses von Endlich-
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keiten fort, ohne sie in ihnen und aus ihnen wiederher-
zustellen"; Vorlesungen. . . , ibid.. pp. 49 4-95; 
Enzyklopädie, ibid.., p. 87. 
2 3 H e g e l , "Einleitung," Phänomenologie. . . , ibid.; 
Enzyklopädie, ibid., pp. 84-85, 116-17; Science of Logic, 
ibid., pp. 73-75. For a discussion of Hegel's criticisms 
of Kant and Kant's failure to be self-reflexive, see J. 
Smith, "Hegel's Critique of Kant," Review of Metaphysics, 
26, No. 3 (1973), 438-60; and R. Pippin, "Hegel's 
Phenomenological Criticism," Man and World. 8, No. 3 
(1975), 296-314. 
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CORRECTION 
AUSLEGUNG IV, 1, p. 35 ("Transcendental Arguments: 
Verificationism or Parasitism?" by Douglas Ehring): The 
sentence, "On the other hand, the correct2 use of "in-
ner experience" concepts requires the use of "physical 
object" concepts" should read as follows: 
On the other hand, the correct-use of an ex-
pression would imply its correct^ use. The 
"parasitism" argument might show that the 
correct, use of "inner experience" concepts 
requires the use of "physical object" concepts. 
